COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. III. No. 20.] *London, Saturday, 21st May,* 1803. [Price 10D

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TO THE RIGHT HON. LORD AUCKLAND.

MY LORD,—In times like the present, the public conduct of every man, be he high or low, ought to be strictly canvassed, in order that the people may know on whom they can safely place confidence; in order that they may be able to distinguish the true friends of their sovereign and their country from those who make use of the affectation of such friendship as a mask to disguise views which are directed solely to their own interest and ambition. Upon this principle, my lord, without pretending to say which of these classes your lordship belongs to, I am about to compare your support of the peace of Amiens with your former opinions and professions on the subject of peace with France.

Your lordship can scarcely have forgotten, that, in the year 1795, you wrote and published a pamphlet, entitled, "*Some Remarks on the apparent Circumstances of the War in the fourth week of October,* 1795," the object of which pamphlet was to clear the road for negotiations with France, and to point out the terms which ought to form the basis of a peace between his Majesty and the king-killing Directors who then governed the Republic.—The relative situation of the two powers is the first object of consideration. I shall now quote your description of that situation, begging your lordship to ask yourself, as you proceed, whether, at the time when the fatal peace of Amiens was concluded, we were not in a much better state, than that which you here describe.—"I am content "to argue, even on the hypothesis, that "our allies in the war are either conquered, or worn out, or withdrawn, or so "circumstanced, that they afford no reasonable hope of farther aid or concurrence; that all prospect of success on "the eastern or northern frontiers of France "is lost; that our continental exertions "(and expenses) are or ought to be suspended; and that the several European "powers will either make a forced peace, "maintain an interested neutrality, or "pursue inefficient hostilities, according "to their necessities, speculations, and faculties. On the other hand I assume, "that England possesses a great naval "superiority. I will further suppose, that "the French leaders are disposed to treat "for peace. In this predicament, feeling "the pressure of the public expense; feeling that the country is desirous of peace; "and considering the high price of the "necessaries of life, to the general scarcity "of which the war certainly contributes, "though in a much less degree than is "commonly supposed; knowing also that "there are certain bounds, beyond which "our resources cannot be forced without "danger; I ask myself whether it is expedient to treat for peace, and on what "general outline and stipulations it might "be expedient to conclude a peace."—Now, my lord, as to the Continent, you here suppose our situation to be full as bad as it was in October, 1801; while, on the other hand, you had not to balance against it, the possession of the Dutch colonies in the East and West-Indies and South America, of Elba, of Malta, of the Cape of Good Hope, to which may be added the effects of the victories of Lords Duncan and Nelson, and of the brilliant Egyptian campaign. With respect to our domestic concerns, you allow the people to be desirous of peace: they were much less so in 1801. You allow of the high price and great scarcity of the necessaries of life: in October, 1801, all alarm on that head was at an end; the most abundant harvest ever known had just been housed without the least injury from the weather, and the price of provisions, of every sort, was rapidly on the decline. You felt the pressure of the public expense, and perceived, that there were certain bounds, beyond which our resources could not be forced without danger: the makers of the peace have constantly rejected, with disdain, the plea of pecuniary necessity: Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt have both explicitly declared, that, in October, 1801, we were "far, very far indeed, from the end of our resources," and to support this assertion has been the prin-

cipal object of your lordship's public endeavours for four months past.

Seeing, then, that our relative situation, at the time of signing the preliminaries, was in no one respect worse, and in most respects so much better, than it was when you wrote and published your pamphlet, let us see whether the terms, on which you would then have insisted, were obtained by that treaty, of which you afterwards approved.—— "It is the *duty*," say you, "of "those who conduct the war to treat for "peace whenever negotiation *can* TEND to "*any* PROBABLE good. The *system* of the "French government (whatever may be "its particular *form*) is no longer likely to "be an obstacle to negotiation."—I stop here, just to remark, that, as to the first of these propositions, whatever war-minister is weak enough to make it a rule of his conduct will most assuredly be defeated; he will never have, and he never ought to have, an *ally*; and, which is still worse, he will certainly never have the cordial support of the country. He may, by acting upon such a maxim, always preserve a majority of poor, feeble, time-serving voices; he may keep his place, but he will ruin his country.—As to the second proposition, that the *system* and *form* of the French government would be *no obstacle to negotiation*, it was, unhappily for the safety and honour of England, but too correct a prediction of what was about to follow,—a regicide negotiation, begun, broken off, resumed, broken off again, again solicited and ending at last in the regicide peace of Amiens. Yes, my lord, you had the honour to be one of the avant-coureurs in this pursuit of national degradation, of the woeful effects of which what we have hitherto felt and what we now feel is but the mere foretaste of that which is to follow.——But, to come to the *terms*, on which you would have insisted in the fourth week of October, 1795. ——"The extent of the French claims, as "to the price of pacification is known. If "we are to suppose, that their leaders will "*adhere* to what they have professed in "their late decree" [and Buonaparté has adhered to it, my lord, without the least relaxation; observe that well]. "I cannot "hesitate to say, that the preponderance, "which our accession to those claims, *or* "*to any considerable part of them*, must give "to France, unless an adequate compensa"tion in some other shape can be secured "to us, would be *disbonourable*, and exhibit "us to the present age, and to posterity, "as submitting to have the law prescribed "to us by our enemy.—And what law? "*The sacrifice of powers that have been the* "*most nearly connected with us*; the direct "or indirect *annexation to France of all the* "*ports of the continent from Dunkirk to Ham*"*burgh*; an immense cession of territory; "and, in one word, the *abandonment of the* "*independence of Europe*."—Well, then, my Lord, we did accede to these claims, and claims ten times greater, by the peace of Amiens, and yet you approved of, you voted for, and you endeavoured to defend this peace!—To come at a full and fair view of your inconsistency, however, we must hear your terms of 1795 a little more in detail. We have seen what you would have rejected; let us now see your demands.—"On the whole view of our respective si"tuations, and after making to France a "full allowance for all her continental ad"vantages, and considering at the same "time our acquisitions and prospects, and "the comparative state of circumstances, "we are entitled to require, *that the French* "*armies shall be recalled within their* OLD "BOUNDARIES; that Europe, in the gene"ral effect of arrangements, shall be re"placed as nearly as may be, *on the same* "*balance* AS BEFORE THE WAR; and par"ticularly with respect to the naval and "commercial interests of these kingdoms, "that France shall *not have obtained*, in the "result, *any new means of* PREPONDE"RANCE."—These, my Lord, these were the conditions on which, and on which alone, you would have made peace at the disastrous time when your pamphlet was written; at a time when our situation, and our prospects, were infinitely worse than at any other period of the war, and particularly at that period, that successful, prosperous, and brilliant period when the preliminary treaty of peace was concluded. The Richmond Park minister might plead the fallen state of the powers of the Continent; but this circumstance could have no weight in your Lordship's mind, seeing that, in 1795, you bottomed your demands upon the hypothesis, that all those allies "were "either conquered, or worn out, or with"drawn; that all our continental exertions "were, or ought to be, suspended; and "that the several powers would either make "a forced peace, or maintain an interested "neutrality." You, therefore, my Lord, have no ground whatever, whereon to set up a justification of your defence of the treaty of Amiens, by which all your principles, all your practical propositions, were completely abandoned.

Nor shall we, I fear, discover any greater degree of consistency by referring your opinions of 1795, as to the alternative of continuing the war.—"We have incurred the

" chief expenses and inconveniencies of war;
" we have compleated arrangements of
" force, which, by the nature of our com-
" merce and constitution, can never be at-
" tained *without great delay and difficulty*;
" our military establishment is high and re-
" spectable; our navy is carried to an im-
" provement and pre-eminence in strength
" and skill, of which there is no example
" in our history; we have prepared, and
" are sending to sea an expedition, from
" which it is reasonable to expect imper-
" tant effects: thus circumstanced it is
" surely wiser to prosecute the war, than to
" close it on conditions which would oblige
" us, either *to continue the expense of war*, or
" to expose ourselves to *a sudden return of*
" *dangers and calamities*, with the disadvan-
" tage of being *unprepared for them*. Let us
" have a peace, and *not a temporary and*
" *short suspension of war*; let us have a peace,
" such as may make it *consistent with prudence*
" *to disarm*, and such as may afford a good
" ground of *social security*."—Was this, my Lord, the description of the peace of Amiens? Was this the sort of peace, which the ministers made, and which you have, for eighteen months past, been endeavouring to defend? Has not this peace obliged us to continue the expense of war? Has it not been a temporary and short suspension of hostilities? In short, were not its terms, and have not its effects been, precisely such terms and such consequences as you deprecated? And, yet, my Lord, have you not, even with a zeal which may be justly described as officious, endeavoured to defend this peace, and to prolong the fatal influence by which it was brought upon the country? Into the *motives*, by which you have been actuated, my Lord, I, at present, forbear to inquire. Your conduct is before me; it is clearly seen; and upon that conduct I and every other of his Majesty's faithful subjects have an undoubted right to form, and to express, our opinions. Weak and wicked ministers would never be formidable to the country, unless supported by persons not making part of the cabinet, not immediately partaking of their responsibility: it is, therefore, of the utmost importance, when we are preparing to demand justice on the heads of such ministers, to point out those by whom they have been aided and abetted, to turn the eyes of the nation towards such abettors, and, thereby, to subject their conduct to that scrutiny, the result and the effects of which is the only possible check upon the further pursuit of their views. Such, my Lord, is the object of this letter; and, certain I am, that it is an object which must meet with general approbation amongst all those who prefer the good of their country to the furthering of their own private interests.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Westr. 16th May, 1803.

LORD HAWKESBURY ON MALTA.

SIR,—Party hostility is apt sometimes to confuse the very best intellects, and it seems to have thrown a cloud over your understanding, in your last number; for I am in candour bound to suppose that your unfounded attack on Lord Hawkesbury's veracity is to be attributed to no worse cause.

You charge his Lordship in very direct terms with falsehood, because he once declared that ministers " *had no* OFFICIAL *documents*," relative to the rights of the people of Malta and the Order. Now, Sir, pray look again at the papers which you print as the evidence of your charge, and acknowledge your own calumny.—It is possible that your readers may think that you do establish the " injustice, cruelty, and " perfidy" of ministers towards the poor Maltese. Perhaps too, there may be some little apparent ground for charging them with pusillanimity in their conduct towards the deputies. It may have been a paltry departure from true old English feeling to shut the doors of all our offices against those who came to seek our protection, and hurry them as fast as we could out of the kingdom, under an apprehension of giving jealousy to France. But, in point of fact, were they not hurried out of the kingdom? were not the doors of our offices shut against them? How then could a letter delivered to Lord Hobart's porter, *at his own private house*, be called an official document? When ministers had so sacrificed the honour and faith of the country, for the very purpose of making all these communications unofficial, it was impossible they could produce them as official. It would have been an affront to Parliament, as well as to the First Consul; and Lord Hawkesbury was equally correct in his assertion and his conduct.—Mr. Addington's declaration indeed, may seem more difficult to reconcile with Mr. Mackenzie's papers. The respectable gentleman is said to have stated, that, he had the satisfaction to know that the Maltese were grateful for what we had done in their favour, while the deputies themselves, in their remonstrance, avow that the preliminary articles had made a very unfavourable impression. But every body knows that Mr. Addington is a man of the best intentions, and it is probable that he may have made a slight mistake of one word for another, between " hope" and " satisfaction,"

just as he lately did with regard to the same words, in answer to General Gascoign's enquiries about the present negotiation. If this defence gives no satisfaction, I must content myself with hoping that a better will be suggested by my namesake of Reading. I am more immediately interested for my friend Lord Hawkesbury, whose veracity I trust you will now admit.—I am, Sir, yours,

CANDIDUS.

Albemarle Street, 9th May.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

DECLARATION OF WAR, *on the Part of Great-Britain, laid before Parliament, on the 18th May, 1803.*

His Majesty's earnest endeavours for the preservation of peace having failed of success, he entertains the fullest confidence that he shall recieve the same support from his Parliament, and that the same zeal and spirit will be manifested by his people, which he has experienced on every occasion when the honour of his Crown has been attacked, or the essential interests of his Dominions have been endangered.——During the whole course of the negotiations which led to the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties of Peace between his Majesty and the French Republic, it was his Majesty's sincere desire, not only to put an end to the hostilities which subsisted between the two countries, but to adopt such measures, and to concur in such propositions, as might most effectually contribute to consolidate the general tranquillity of Europe. The same motives by which his Majesty was actuated during the negotiations for peace, have since invariably governed his conduct. As soon as the Treaty of Amiens was concluded, his Majesty's Courts were open to the people of France for every purpose of legal redress; all sequestrations were taken off their property; all prohibitions on their trade which had been imposed during the war were removed, and they were placed, in every respect, on the same footing with regatd to commerce and intercourse, as the inhabitants of any other State in amity with his Majesty, with which there existed no treaty of commerce——To a system of conduct thus open, liberal, and friendly, the proceedings of the French Government afford the most striking contrast. The prohibitions which had been placed on the commerce of his Majesty's subjects during the war, have been enforced with increased strictness and severity; violence has been offered in several instances to their vessels and their property; and, in no case, has justice been afforded to those who may have been aggrieved in consequence of such acts, nor has any satisfactory answer been given to the repeated representations made by his Majesty's Ministers or Ambassador at Paris. Under such circumstances, when his Majesty's subjects were not suffered to enjoy the common advantages of peace within the territories of the French Republic, and the countries dependent upon it, the French Government had recourse to the extraordinary measure of sending over to this country a number of persons for the professed purpose of residing in the most considerable Sea-port Towns of Great-Britain and Ireland, in the character of Commercial Agents or Consuls. These persons could have no pretensions to be acknowledged in that character, as the right of being so acknowledged, as well as all the privileges attached to such a situation, could only be derived from a Commercial Treaty; and as no treaty of that description was in existence between his Majesty and the French Republic.——There was consequently too much reason to suppose, that the real object of their mission was by no means of a commercial nature, and this suspicion was confirmed, not only by the circumstance that some of them were military men, but by the actual discovery, that several of them were furnished with instructions to obtain the soundings of the harbours, and to procure military surveys of the places where it was intended they should reside. His Majesty felt it to be his duty to prevent their departure to their respective places of destination, and represented to the French Government the necessity of withdrawing them; and it cannot be denied, that the circumstances under which they were sent, and the instructions which were given to them, ought to be considered as decisive indications of the dispositions and intentions of the Government by whom they were employed.——The conduct of the French Government, with respect to the commercial intercourse between the two countries, must therefore be considered as ill suited to a state of peace, and their proceedings in their more general political relations, as well as in those which immediately concern his Majesty's Dominions, appear to have been altogether inconsistent with every principle of good faith, moderation, and justice. His Majesty has entertained hopes, in consequence of the repeated assurances and professions of the French Government, that they might have been induced to adopt a system of policy which, if it had not inspired other powers with confidence, might at least have allayed their jealousies. If the French Government had really appeared to be actuated by a due attention to such a system; if their dispositions had proved to be essentially pacific, allowances would have been made for the situation in which a new government must be placed after so dreadful and extensive a convulsion as that which has been produced by the French Revolution. But his Majesty has unfortunately had too much reason to observe and to lament, that the system of violence, aggression, and aggrandizement which characterized the proceedings of the different Governments of France during the war, has been continued with as little disguise since its termination. They have continued to keep a French army in Holland against the will, and in defiance of the remonstrances of the Batavian Government, and in repugnance to the letter of three solemn treaties. They have, in a period of peace, invaded the territory, and violated the independence of the Swiss Nation, in defiance of the Treaty of Luneville, which had stipulated the independence of their territory, and the right of the inhabitants to choose their own form of Government. They have annexed to the dominions of France, Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia, and the Island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of the most valuable part of his territory, though they were bound, by a solemn engagement to the Emperor of Russia, to attend to his interests, and to provide for his establishment. It may, indeed, with truth be asserted, that the period which has elapsed since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, has been marked with one continued series of aggression, violence, and insult on the part of the French Government——In the month of October last, his Majesty was induced, in consequence of the earnest solicita-

tion of the Swiss Nation, to make an effort, by a representation to the French Government, to avert the evils which were then impending over that country. This representation was couched in the most temperate terms; and measures were taken by his Majesty for ascertaining, under the circumstances which then existed, the real situation and wishes of the Swiss Cantons, as well as the sentiments of the other Cabinets of Europe. His Majesty learned, however, with the utmost regret, that no disposition to counteract these repeated infractions of treaties and acts of violence was manifested by any of the powers most immediately interested in preventing them; and his Majesty therefore felt that, with respect to these objects, his single efforts could not be expected to produce any considerable advantage to those in whose favour they might be exerted.——It was about this time that the French Government first distinctly advanced the principle, that his Majesty had no right to complain of the conduct, or to interfere with the proceedings of France, on any point which did not form a part of the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens. That treaty was unquestionably founded upon the same principle as every other antecedent treaty or convention, on the assumption of the state of possession and of engagements subsisting at the time of its conclusion; and if that state of possession and of engagements is materially affected by the voluntary act of any of the parties, so as to prejudice the condition on which the other party has entered into the contract, the change so made, may be considered as operating virtually as a breach of the treaty itself, and as giving the party aggrieved a right to demand satisfaction or compensation for any substantial difference which such acts may have effected in their relative situations; but whatever may be the principle on which the treaty is to be considered as founded, there is indisputably a General Law of Nations, which, though liable to be limited, explained, or restrained by Conventional Law, is antecedent to it, and is that law or rule of conduct to which all sovereigns and states have been accustomed to appeal, where Conventional Law is admitted to have been silent. The Treaty of Amiens, and every other treaty, in providing for the objects to which it is particularly directed, does not therefore assume or imply an indifference to all other objects which are not specified in its stipulations, much less does it adjudge them to be of a nature to be left to the will and caprice of the violent and the powerful. The justice of the cause is alone a sufficient ground to warrant the interposition of any of the powers of Europe in the differences which may arise between other States, and the application and extent of that just interposition is to be determined solely by considerations of prudence. These principles can admit of no dispute; but if the new and extraordinary pretension advanced by the French Government, to exclude his Majesty from any right to interfere with respect to the concerns of other powers, unless they made a specific part of the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens, was that which it was possible to maintain, those powers would have a right, at least, to claim the benefit of this principle, in every case of difference between the two countries. The indignation of all Europe must surely then be excited by the declarations of the French government, that, in the event of hostilities, these very powers who were no parties to the treaty of Amiens, and who were not allowed to derive any advantage from the remonstrances of his Majesty in their behalf, are nevertheless to be made the victims of a war which is alleged to arise out of the same treaty, and are to be sacrificed in a contest which they not only have not occasioned, but which they have had no means whatever of preventing.——His Majesty judged it most expedient, under the circumstances which then affected Europe, to abstain from a recurrence to hostilities on account of the views of ambition and acts of aggression manifested by France on the Continent; yet an experience of the character and dispositions of the French government could not fail to impress his Majesty with a sense of the necessity of increased vigilance in guarding the rights and dignity of his Crown, and in protecting the interests of His people.—Whilst his Majesty was actuated by these sentiments, He was called upon by the French government to evacuate the Island of Malta. His Majesty had manifested, from the moment of the signature of the Definitive Treaty, an anxious disposition to carry into full effect the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens relative to that Island. As soon as he was informed that an election of a Grand Master had taken place, under the auspices of the Emperor of Russia, and that it had been agreed by the different Priories assembled at St. Petersburgh to acknowledge the person whom the Court of Rome should select out of those who had been named by them to be Grand Master of the Order of St. John, his Majesty proposed to the French government, for the purpose of avoiding any difficulties which might arise in the execution of the arrangement, to acknowledge that election to be valid: and when, in the month of August, the French government applied to his Majesty to permit the Neapolitan troops to be sent to the Island of Malta, as a preliminary measure for preventing any unnecessary delay, his Majesty consented without hesitation to this proposal, and gave directions for the admission of the Neapolitan troops into the Island. His Majesty had thus shewn his disposition not only to throw no obstacle in the way of the execution of the Treaty, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the execution of it by every means in his power. His Majesty cannot, however, admit, that at any period since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, the French government have had a right to call upon him, in conformity to the stipulations of that Treaty, to withdraw his forces from the Island of Malta. At the time when this demand was made by the French government, several of the most important stipulations of the arrangement respecting Malta remained unexecuted: the election of a Grand Master had not been carried into effect. The tenth article had stipulated that the independence of the Island should be placed under the guarantee and protection of Great Britain, France, Austria, Rossia, Spain, and Prussia. The Emperor of Germany had acceded to the guarantee, but only on condition of a like accession on the part of the other powers specified in the article. The Emperor of Russia had refused his accession, except on the condition that the Maltese Langue should be abrogated; and the King of Prussia had given no answer whatever to the application which had been made to him to accede to the arrangement. But the fundamental principle, upon the existence of which depended the execution of the other parts of the article, had been defeated by the changes which had taken place in the constitution of the Order since the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace. It was to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem that his Majesty was, by the first stipulation of the 10th

article, bound to restore the Island of Malta. The Order is defined to consist of those Langues which were in existence at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty: the three French Langues having been abolished, and a Maltese Langue added to the institution. The Order consisted, therefore, at that time of the following Langues, viz. of Arragon, Castile, Germany, Bavaria, and Russia. Since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, the Langues of Arragon and Castile have been separated from the Order by Spain, a part of the Italian Langue has been abolished by the annexation of Piedmont and Parma to France. There is strong reason to believe that it has been in contemplation to sequestrate the property of the Bavarian Langue, and the intention has been avowed of keeping the Russian Langues within the dominions of the Emperor.——Under these circumstances, the Order of St. John cannot now be considered as that body to which, according to the stipulations of the Treaty, the Island was to be restored; and the funds indispensably necessary for its support, and for the maintenance of the independence of that Island, have been nearly, if not wholly, sequestered. Even if this had arisen from circumstances which it was not in the power of any of the contracting parties to the treaty to control, his Majesty would nevertheless have had a right to defer the evacuation of the Island by his forces, until such time as an equivalent arrangement had been concluded for the preservation of the independence of the Order and of the Island. But if these changes have taken place in consequence of any acts of the other parties of the Treaty; if the French government shall appear to have proceeded upon a system of rendering the Order whose independence they had stipulated, incapable of maintaining that independence, his Majesty's right to continue in the occupation of the Island, under such circumstances, will hardly be contested. It is indisputable, that the revenues of the two Spanish Langues have been withdrawn from the Order by his Catholic Majesty; a part of the Italian Langue has in fact been abolished by France, through the unjust annexation of Piedmont and Parma, and Placentia, to the French territory. The Elector of Bavaria has been instigated by the French government to sequestrate the property of the Order within his territories; and it is certain that they have not only sanctioned, but encouraged the idea of the propriety of separating the Russian Langues from the remainder of the Order.——As the conduct of the governments of France and Spain, have, therefore, in some instances directly, and in others indirectly, contributed to the changes which have taken place in the Order, and thus destroyed its means of supporting its independence, it is to those governments, and not to his Majesty, that the non-execution of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens must be ascribed.——Such would be the just conclusion, if the tenth article of that Treaty were considered as an arrangement by itself. It must be observed, however, that this article forms a part only of a Treaty of Peace, the whole of which is connected together, and the stipulations of which must, upon a principle common to all Treaties, be construed as having a reference to each other.——His Majesty was induced by the Treaty of Peace to consent to abandon, and to restore to the Order of St. John the Island of Malta, on condition of its independence and neutrality. But a further condition which must necessarily be supposed to have had considerable influence with his Majesty in inducing him to make so important a concession, was the acquiescence of the French government in an arrangement for the security of the Levant, by the eighth and ninth articles in the Treaty, stipulating the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and the independence of the Ionian Islands. His Majesty has, however, since learnt, that the French government have entertained views hostile to both these objects; and that they have even suggested the idea of a partition of the Turkish Empire. These views must now be manifest to all the world, from the official publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani; from the conduct of that officer, and of the other French agents in Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian Islands, and from the distinct admission of the First Consul himself, in his communication with Lord Whitworth. His Majesty was, therefore, warranted in considering it to be the determination of the French government to violate those articles of the Treaty of Peace, which stipulated for the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, and of the Ionian Islands, and consequently he would not have been justified in evacuating the Island of Malta, without receiving some other security, which might equally provide for these important objects. His Majesty accordingly feels that he has an incontestable claim, in consequence of the conduct of France since the Treaty of Peace, and with reference to the objects which made part of the stipulations of that Treaty, to refuse, under the present circumstances, to relinquish the possession of the Island of Malta.—Yet notwithstanding this right, so clear and so unquestionable, the alternative presented by the French government to his Majesty, in language the most peremptory and menacing, was the evacuation of Malta, or the renewal of war.—If the views of ambition and aggrandizement, which have thus been manifested by the French government since the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, have in so very particular a manner attracted the attention of his Majesty, it has been equally impossible for him not to feel, and not to notice, the repeated indignities which have been offered by that government to his Crown, and to his people.—The report of Colonel Sebastiani contains the most unwarrantable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's government, against the officer who commanded his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter. This paper cannot be considered as the publication of a private individual; it has been avowed, and indeed bears evidence upon the face of it, that it is the official report of an accredited agent, published by the authority of the government to which it was addressed, who thereby have given it their express sanction.——This report had been published a very short time, when another indignity was offered to this country in the communication of the First Consul of France to the Legislative Body. In this communication he presumes to affirm, in the character of Chief Magistrate of that country, "that "Great Britain cannot singly contend against the "power of France;" an assertion as unfounded as it is indecent, disproved by the events of many wars, and by none more than by those of the war which has been recently concluded. Such an assertion, advanced in the most solemn official act of a government, and thereby meant to be avowed to all the powers of Europe, can be considered in no other light than as a defiance publicly offered to his Majesty, and to a brave and powerful people, who are both willing and able to defend his just rights, and those of their country, against every insult and aggression. The conduct of the First

Consul to his Majesty's Ambassador at his audience, in presence of the ministers of most of the Sovereigns and States of Europe, furnishes another instance of provocation on the part of the French government, which it would be improper not to notice on the present occasion, and the subsequent explanation of this transaction may be considered as having the effect of aggravating instead of palliating the affront.

At the very time when his Majesty was demanding satisfaction and explanation on some of the points above-mentioned, the French Minister at Hamburgh endeavoured to obtain the insertion in a Hamburgh paper of a most gross and opprobrious libel against his Majesty; and when difficulties were made respecting the insertion of it, he availed himself of his official character of Minister of the French Republic, to require the publication of it by order of his Government in the Gazette of the Senate of that Town. With this requisition so made, the Senate of Hamburgh were induced to comply; and thus has the independence of that town been violated, and a free State made the instrument, by the menace of the French Government, of propagating throughout Europe, upon their authority, the most offensive and unfounded calumnies against his Majesty and his Government. His Majesty might add to this list of indignities, the requisition which the French Government have repeatedly urged, that the Laws and Constitution of his Country should be changed relative to the Liberty of the Press. His Majesty might likewise add the calls which the French Government have on several occasions made upon him to violate the laws of hospitality with respect to persons who had found an asylum within his Dominions, and against whose conduct no charge whatever has at any time been substantiated. It is impossible to reflect on these different proceedings, and the course which the French Government have thought proper to adopt respecting them, without the thorough conviction that they are not the effect of accident; but that they form a part of a system which has been adopted for the purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his Majesty and his Government. — Under all these insults and provocations, his Majesty, not without a due sense of his dignity has proceeded with every degree of temper and moderation to obtain satisfaction and redress, while he has neglected no means consistent with his honour and the safety of his Dominions, to induce the Government of France to concede to him, what is, in his judgment, absolutely necessary for the future tranquillity of Europe. His efforts in this respect have proved abortive, and he has therefore judged it necessary to order his Ambassador to leave Paris. In having recourse to this proceeding, it has been his Majesty's object to put an end to the fruitless discussions which have too long subsisted between the two Governments, and to close a period of suspense peculiarly injurious to the subjects of his Majesty. But, though the provocations which His Majesty has received might entitle him to larger claims than those which he has advanced, yet anxious to prevent calamities which might thus be extended to every part of Europe, he is still willing, as far as is consistent with his own Honour, and the interests of His People, to afford every facility to any just and honourable arrangement, by which such evils may be averted. He has, therefore, no difficulty in declaring to all Europe, that notwithstanding all the changes which have taken place since the Treaty of Peace, notwithstanding the extension of the Power of France, in repugnance to that Treaty, and to the spirit of Peace itself, His Majesty will not avail Himself of these circumstances, to demand in compensation all that He is entitled to require, but will be ready to concur, even now, in an arrangement by which Satisfaction shall be given to Him, for the Indignities which have been offered to His Crown and to His People, and substantial security afforded against further encroachments on the part of France.—His Majesty has thus distinctly and unreservedly stated the reasons of those proceedings to which he has found himself compelled to resort. He is actuated by no disposition to interfere in the internal concerns of any other State; by no projects of conquest and aggrandizement; but solely by a sense of what is due to the honour of His Crown, and the interests of His People, and by an anxious desire to obstruct the further progress of a system, which if not resisted, may prove fatal to every part of the civilized world.

Order of his Britannic Majesty in Council for making reprisals on the French Republic.—Dated May 16, 1803, and taken from the London Gazette of May 17.

At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 16th of May 1803, present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas, in consequence of the repeated insults and provocations which his Majesty has experienced from the government of France, his Majesty finds himself compelled to take such measures as are necessary for vindicating the honour of his crown, and the just rights of his subjects; his Majesty, therefore, is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects of the French Republic; so that as well his Majesty's fleets and ships, as also all other ships and vessels that shall be commissionated, by letters of marque, or general reprisals, or otherwise, by his Majesty's commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods belonging to the French Republic, or to any persons being subjects of the French Republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the French Republic, and bring the same to judgment in such Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions, as shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance thereof; and, to that end, his Majesty's Advocate-General, with the Advocate of the Admiralty, are forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to his Majesty at this board, authorising the commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral, or any person or persons by them empowered and appointed, to issue forth and grant letters of marque and reprisals to any of his Majesty's subjects, or others whom the said commissioners shall deem fitly qualified in that behalf, for the apprehending, seizing, and taking the ships, vessels, and goods, belonging to the French Republic, or to any persons being subjects of the French Republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the French Republic; and that such powers and clauses be inserted in the said commission, as have been usual, and are according to former precedents; and his Majesty's said Advocate-General, with the Advocate of the Admiralty, are also forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to his Majesty at this board, authorising the said commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral, to will and require

the High Court of Admiralty of Great Britain, and the lieutenant and judge of the said Court, his surrogate or surrogates, as also the several Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions which shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance of, and judicially proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and reprisals of all ships and goods that are or shall be made, and to hear and determine the same, and according to the course of Admiralty and the laws of nations, to adjudge and condemn all such ships, vessels, and goods as shall belong to the French Republic or to any persons being subjects of the French Republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the French Republic; and that such powers and clauses be inserted in the said commission as have been usual and are according to former precedents; and they are likewise to prepare and lay before his Majesty at this board a draft of such instructions as may be proper to be sent to the said several Courts of Admiralty in his Majesty's foreign governments and plantations for their guidance herein; as also another draft of instructions for such ships as shall be commissionated for the purposes above-mentioned.

From the Court at the Queen's Palace, the sixteenth day of May, One thousand eight hundred and three.

Eldon, C. Portland, P. Westmorland, C. P. S. Atholl, Roxburgh, Salisbury, C. Townshend, Dartmouth, Chesterfield, Harrington, Chatham, Rosslyn, Onslow, Courtown, Castlereagh, Hawkesbury, Pelham, Cathcart, Auckland, Bayning, Glenbervie, Henry Addington, C. F. Greville, Vice Ch. Wm. Wynne, Thomas Steele, Wm. Scott, Isaac Corry, C. Yorke, Thomas Wallace, J. Smyth, J. Hiley Addington.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

EMIGRATION.—A report has been made to the House of Commons from the committee appointed to examine into the survey of the coasts, &c. of Scotland, relating to emigration; and, upon the authority of this report, the following resolutions were, on the 17th inst. moved by Mr. Hawkins Browne.—"That "persons emigrating from different parts of "the United Kingdom to his Majesty's "plantations, &c. had suffered greatly from "the crowded state of the ships, from the "want of provisions, &c.—That the ships "ought to be regulated with regard to the "number of persons they take on board, the "quantity of provisions, &c."—Those who read some of the first numbers of the newspaper called THE PORCUPINE, will recollect, that, in an article, entitled "*White Slave* "*Trade*," the necessity of some such regulation as that which appears to be now in contemplation was pointed out, and the aid of the legislature therein loudly called for. We cannot, however, help expressing our surprise, that the subject should have lain dormant for nearly three years, and that it should now have been brought forward by a cause so comparatively insignificant. The present report gives an account of the emigration, during the years 1801, and 1802, *from the coasts and central Highlands of Scotland*. The places to which the emigrants have gone, the numbers in each year, and the totals of both years taken together, are as follows.

Emigrated to	in 1801	in 1802	in both
Nova Scotia.....	669	198	867
Upper Canada.....		2,173	2,173
Cape Breton.....		340	340
United States of America.....	130	600	730
Totals.....	799	3,311	4,110

The first observation that presents itself is, the great difference between the last year of war and the first year of the "blessings "of peace," of that peace and plenty, brought us by the treaty of Amiens; and, one cannot but admire the modesty and candour of Mr. Addington in not availing himself of this circumstance in stating the vast increase of his *exports* of British produce.—Four thousand one hundred and ten persons are, we perceive all that have emigrated from the Highlands in the course of two years, and of this number the whole, except 730, have gone *to his Majesty's dominions*, are still his subjects, and are, probably, as to the general interests of the empire, full as advantageously employed, and full as happily for themselves, as if they had remained in the Highlands, or had come to crowd the Custom-house, the Excise, and the other public offices in London. In the Appendix of the Report, the committee has given an extract from the evidence of a Mr. James Grant of Redcastle, who states, that the emigration, from the part of the country alluded to, *since* the conclusion of the war, has amounted to 5,000 souls; that an equal number are ready to embark this season; that the whole depopulation to be expected from this cause, might extend to 25,000 souls, a full *third part* of all the existing inhabitants of the West-Highlands including the adjacent Islands.——Truely this is an alarming circumstance, and highly deserving legislative attention; but, how comes it, that the ministers, both the present and the last, have constantly turned a deaf ear to all the representations relative to the emigration from Ireland and Wales? In the latter of these, the means of emigration have been furnished by the parish officers, in order to get rid of the poor. Publications the most delusive and false have been made for the express purpose of inveighing away the ignorant country people, not to Nova Scotia and Canada, but to the United States of America, where they must be for ever lost to the British empire. We know, that these facts

were duly communicated to the present ministers: and we also know, that they paid no attention to them; that they made no one exertion to undeceive the people, though ample means for so doing were ready at their hand. How comes it, then, that the subject is *now* taken up? There have been more than 10,000 souls, upon an average, emigrated from Ireland to the United States, every year for ten years last past. Horrid is the treatment, which these people have met with at sea, and, after their landing, they have been sold by public advertisement. How comes it, then, we again ask, that the voice of neither interest nor humanity has been listened to till *now?* The emigration from Ireland, not to the King's dominions, but to foreign parts, has been greater in amount, within the last ten years, than the whole population of the West Highlands of Scotland; and, why are not the interests of Ireland, why are not the health and lives of her people as dear to the government as are the interests of Scotland and the health and lives of her people? Where is the ground of this partiality? Is Ireland less fertile than the Highlands of Scotland? Can the people live in the latter easier and better than in the former? or are the land-holders in the Highlands more faithful to the minister of the day than are the land-holders of Ireland? All that appears to be intended by the bill, at present to be brought in, is, to prevent ill-treatment to the emigrants; but, it is very clear from the language of the report, that the ultimate object is to *prevent emigration*, not only of men but of *money*; for at the close of the return for 1802, it is said: "this "year, the passengers, including freight-"money, took out of the country, above "£100,000 sterling cash—*lost to it for* "*ever!*"—Almost all the emigrants went to Canada, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton, and it is not very fair to suppose, that their cash, their dear delicious cash, was lost to the *country* for ever, unless, by the word country Scotland *alone* is meant. Besides, why should not the poor Highlanders carry away their cash as well as the noblemen and gentlemen of Scotland and England? We greatly doubt that cash expended by these people on the woods of Canada and Nova Scotia is more completely lost to the empire than that which the Duchess of Gordon, Duke of Bedford, and a list of others too loathsome to enumerate, have expended in Paris. A hundred thousand pounds lost to the country for ever! *Three millions* of pounds have been thus lost for ever, during the same year, by those who have been crouching at the feet of Buonaparté and his wife. The very baubles bought expressly for the purpose of shining in the eyes of our mortal enemy, who to that quality adds the more hateful ones of rebel and usurper, have cost more than all the three thousand Highlanders have taken to America.—That every government has a *right* to prevent emigration to foreign parts is certain; it is not only an undoubted, but a just and equitable right of sovereignty; but, as to the *expedience* of using force for this purpose, that must depend upon circumstances, one of which certainly is not, that the possessers of the land set the un-patriotic example.

FINANCE.—The hirelings of the ministry are always unfortunate in the *time* they choose for vilifying our statements. Just at the moment when a discussion in the House of Lords was *confirming* our representations on the subject of Mr. Addington's estimates, some ministerial creature was advertising a *refutation* of those representations. We have not looked into this representation, a neglect which we participate with the Public, but certain we are, that whatever sum of the nation's money it has been purchased with has been totally thrown away.—Lord Grenville, in admitting, for argument's sake, the correctness of all the accounts laid before Parliament, and proceeding upon the supposition that peace had continued, clearly made out a *deficit* of more than £4,000,000 per annum, instead of a *surplus* of £1,000,000, on which Mr. Addington taught the deceived people to rely, making a difference of more than £5,000,000, between the reality and the estimates of the minister.—The debate, to which we allude, and which will, of course, be given at length in the Supplement to this Volume, was opened, with great ability by Lord King, who appears to be a young nobleman of promise. Lord Moira's speech was one of the best that ever was heard even in that assembly. He acknowledged that he had been deceived as to the treaty of Amiens; he deprecated that system of financial deception, which had long been practised upon the people, in order to cover the blunders and misconduct of ministers, and to prepare the way for some new and unlooked-for sacrifice; and, he satirized, in a most happy vein of contempt, the display of Lord Auckland's "*magnificent* receipts."—Magnificent receipts! What a phrase! What a phrase for a *nobleman* to use! Not a whit less disgusting than the "*heavenly* turtle" of a *Right Honourable* and guttling Lord Mayor. The speech of Lord Grenville, of which those who were not present can have but a very faint notion, unravelled the whole of the labyrinthian deception, and exhibited the juggling minister in his native duplicity. Under blows

like these Lord Auckland was *supported* by the Earl of Westmoreland; *how*, it would not be becoming in us to attempt to describe.——The stock-jobbing lovers of peace and plenty; the omnium eaters; all the innumerable swarm of locusts, who, without stirring ten miles from the capital, devour three-fourths of the produce of the whole land; this destructive race of beings may, and will abuse every one who attempts to open the eyes of the nation, because they must know, that every such attempt tends to their annihilation. But, events will, ere long, speak to them in a most tremendous voice. The thunder already begins to roll, and the bolt will assuredly fall. They may howl, but their howlings will not save them. They may cry "blood-hounds" as long as they please; but they must have war, and *to them* most certainly a war of extermination. The stroke may be postponed for a few months, or for a year or two; but it must come, and that shortly. We, for our parts, believe, that another accommodation with Buonaparté will yet take place: another short respite from conflict: and, the war will, probably, be nothing more than a sort of half peace, conducted by the sapient Addington and his colleagues: but, all this will avail nothing, the great and tremendous war must finally come, and then adieu to all the golden dreams of the votaries of the Temple of Mammon.——The scenes exhibited in the City of London for the last three weeks are too disgusting, too hateful, to contemplate without a mixture of indescribable loathing and horror; and the man who does not desire to see an effectual bar against their recurrence in future must be lost to every sense of shame as well as of honour.

THE WAR.—It is unnecessary to refer our readers to any official document, in order to convince them that war now exists between this country and France; the fact is notorious; it is our province to investigate the circumstances attending that fact, and to examine into the conduct of those who have, on the part of His Majesty, conducted the discussions which have finally led thereunto. Before, however, we enter on this examination; before we make any statement founded on the diplomatic correspondence now on the table of the Parliament; before we exhibit a confirmation of our former conjectures, that the dispute was *invented* for the purpose of *disguising the real cause of the armament*; before we discharge the painful duty of shewing, that the present weak and wicked ministers, after having passed over many just grounds of war, have finally commenced a war, become indeed absolutely necessary to the safety of the kingdom, but the *alleged* grounds of which are not only inadequate but totally false: before we enter on these topics, we cannot refrain from making some general reflections on the present state of things, compared with that state, in which we were previous to the signature of the preliminaries of peace.

After one year and sixteen days of peace, or rather of suspended hostilities, war has again begun, France having during the interval, received from us, all the conquests we had made (the Island of Malta excepted), and having, since the signature of the Preliminaries, and even *in consequence thereof*, gained an immense acquisition of power and of territory, on the Continent of Europe. Holland, from the whole tenor of our complaints as well as from the well-known fact itself, can now be regarded as neither more nor less than an appendage of the Republic of France. The Cape, therefore, Cochin, Demerara, Surinam, Essequibo, and every other spot of earth, which we have restored to the Dutch, have, in reality, been surrendered to France. To France we knew that we were surrendering the Island of Elba, and its almost impregnable fortress and harbour. This was explicitly stated in Parliament, previous to the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty. We have surrendered to her Pondicherry, Martinico, St. Lucia, and Tobago, and have again given her a footing in Newfoundland. We have thrown Turkey into her arms, given her an entrance into the Black Sea, once more exposed the famed Seven Islands to her intrigues, and laid Egypt open to her invasions. Till the preliminary treaty, the treaty of the 1st of October, 1801, the news of which Lord Hawkesbury was so *happy* to communicate to the Mayor of London, till that "death warrant" of England was signed, France did not attempt to take possession of the Italian Republic; it was not till then, that she annexed Piedmont to her territory, and that, by hemming up the Emperor in the further corner of Europe, and by new-modelling the constitution and making a new distribution of the territory and of power of the Empire of Germany, she completed her plan for excluding us from all connexion with the continent, and from all hope of its aid or co-operation.—All these possessions, all these sources of power, all these means of defence as well as of offence, all these innumerable and incalculable advantages, France has gained by the peace, and by the peace alone; while, on our side, that peace

has brought no one single advantage, but has, on the contrary, been productive of almost every mischief that can fall upon a nation. Not one penny of money has it saved to the state, though it, in great part, has disbanded the army and dismantled the fleet, at the same time that it has blasted our fame for good faith as well as for courage, has shaken the credit and broken the spirit of the nation. — Such is the change which the peace has made in our relative state; such is the price which we have paid for three hundred and eighty-one days of the "blessings of peace"; such is the difference between a *renewal* and a *continuation* of the war; such is the accomplishment of Mr. Windham's predictions, and such the comment on the policy of Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt. —— Shame on the coward, who, at the formidable name of this latter gentleman, disguises his sentiments, and affects to believe, that *a ministry differently composed* would have avoided the present crisis, and would have rendered the peace of Amiens advantageous to the country. If any proof were wanted of the fallacy of this supposition, the diplomatic correspondence and other documents, now before the Public, would most amply afford that proof. No; it is the treaties, the degrading, the infamous treaties, these, and these alone have produced the mischief, and would have produced the same mischief, though not quite so soon, perhaps, in the hands of any set of ministers that His Majesty could possibly have chosen. In these treaties were sown the seeds of war and of destruction to England. This was evident to the most superficial politician, though Mr. Pitt could, or affected, not to perceive it. The arrangement respecting Malta that gentleman highly applauded. Malta is now the ostensible object of the war, and it is become so principally because Russia will, on no account, agree *to garrison its fortresses*. This was explicitly foretold in less than twenty days after the signature of the Preliminary Treaty (1); it was repeated again and again, amidst the sneers of the ministers and their stock-jobbing partizans, one of whom had the folly and the assurance to assert, that "the "independence of Malta was as amply pro- "vided for by the Treaty of Amiens, as "the independence of Spain was by the "Treaty of Utrecht"! Let it not, therefore, be said, that the present evils have not *naturally flowed* from the peace. A thousand and a thousand times were the supporters of that peace forewarned, that the moment all our conquests were surrendered, war would ensue. The conquests are surrendered; the war has ensued; the warning was despised, but the prediction is fulfilled; and, unless the people are irretrievably sunk in ignorance and baseness, they will now look with veneration, gratitude, and confidence, to those noblemen and gentlemen, who had the wisdom to foresee, and the integrity and zeal to endeavour to prevent, the calamity and disgrace which has since fallen upon the country. (2)

Having thus stated our opinion as to the first, and constantly prevailing, cause of the event which is now come to pass, we shall now, we trust, clearly shew, that the dispute which has immediately led to this event, was begun by our ministers, and from motives, too, very different indeed from those alleged in their divers declarations. By referring to our Register of the 30th ultimo, p. 631, it will be perceived, that, in noticing a motion, made by Lord Folkestone, for papers relative to the retention and evacuation of the Cape of Good Hope, we stated our concurrence in his lordship's opinion, that the retention, or, rather, the recapture of that post, was the principal, if not the sole, cause of His Majesty's message, and of the armament which thereupon followed; and, that the grounds, alleged in the said message were feigned for the purpose of disguising the real motives of the ministers, who dreaded the charge of perfidy, as well as the real danger to the country, and more especially themselves personally, which might arise, and which would unquestionably have arisen, *if the news of the recapture of the Cape had found them unengaged in any serious dispute with France.* Requesting our readers to re-peruse the whole of the observations, to which we refer, we beg leave to call

(1) See Cobbett's Letters on the Peace, 2d edit. p. 41.—In this letter, and in another, which will be found in the Register, Vol. I. p. 353, the causes of the present rupture, as far as relates to Malta, are clearly pointed out.

(2) The members who voted against the treaty of Amiens, in the House of Lords, on the 13th of May, 1805, were: *Duke* of Richmond; *Marquis* of Buckingham; *Earls*, Carlisle, Warwick, Fitzwilliam, Darlington, Radnor, Spencer, Fortescue, Mansfield, Caernarvon, Carysfort; *Lords*, Kenyon, Grenville, Cawder, Minto; *Bishop* of Rochester (now St. Asaph.)

The members who voted against it in the House of Commons, on the 14th of May, 1803, were: Mr. Windham, Hon. T. Grenville, Lord Temple, Lord Folkestone, Lord Morpeth, Lord Bruce, Lord Kensington, Sir Watkin William Wynne, Bart. Sir Wm. Young, Bart. Hon. C. Dundas, Messrs. C. Wynne, Elliot, Baker, S. Poyntz, Ellis, G. Ellis, Folgambe, Chamberline, B. Cooke, Dr. Laurence, General Lennox, and General Gascoyne.

their particular attention to the following passage: —— "The ministers having "grounded their armament upon the double "pretext of *extraordinary military prepa-* "*rations*, and of *important discussions*, and "being well assured, that the former did "not exist, they were compelled to *make* "the latter; and, if ever the papers re- "lative to the present negotiation should "be made public, it will be seen, that the "important discussions *originated with them*, "and, that, too, *at the very same time when* "*the Message was resolved on.*" — These papers have now been made public, and no one can regret more sincerely than we do, that they amply confirm this conjecture. The war is necessary, absolutely necessary to the preservation of our liberties and lives, and, therefore, we cannot but lament, that the ostensible grounds of it are manifestly unfounded in truth; we cannot but lament, that, for the purpose of sheltering the ignorance, the indecision, the weakness, the selfishness, and the wickedness, of the ministers, the nation has been plunged into a war, upon pretexts that gives to our enemy the appearance of having *right* on his side, and that inevitably tend to excite mistrust of us abroad, and to create and cherish a domestic opposition, a French faction, a political serpent in the bosom of the country, by which all our warlike operations will be cramped, and which may finally produce, at no very distant period, a peace still more injurious, disgraceful and fatal, than the last. Nevertheless, truth and justice, wisdom and policy, all concur in demanding a faithful statement of the case, as it now stands upon the evidence contained in the papers; for, as there is nothing more dishonourable, so is there nothing more foolish, than to hope of succeeding in a war, the real causes and objects of which are hidden from the people.

The papers relative to the negotiation (all of which will be inserted together in the Supplement to this Volume) may be compared to a poem, the main subject of which is Malta, relieved occasionally, by episodes respecting Holland, Switzerland, the Royalists, and the Liberty of the Press, in the last of which the Editor of this work has the honour to be introduced as one of the most implacable enemies of France. To all these topics we shall hereafter have occasion to call the attention of our readers. At present, we must confine ourselves to Malta, which is the pivot of the discussions, and on the terms respecting which the negotiations were finally broken off.

On the 23d of May, only 24 days after the peace was proclaimed in London, we find Otto and Lord Hawkesbury (persons well worthy of each others friendship) corresponding about the appointment of ambassadors to Malta. Between this time and the latter end of January, several letters passed between the secretary of state and others relating to the guarantees of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, which last court refused, unless some modification was made in the Xth article of the treaty of Amiens. —On the 27th of January, we find Talleyrand asking Lord Whitworth, when England meant to evacuate Malta; observing, at the same time, "that another grand "master (Prince Ruspoli having declined the office) "would soon be elected; that "all the powers of Europe invited so to do, "with the exception of Russia, whose dif- "ficulties it was easy to remove, and with- "out whom the guaranty would be equally "complete, were ready to come forward; "(3) and that consequently the term would "soon arrive, when Great-Britain would "have no pretext for keeping longer pos- "session." — This was communicated to Lord Hawkesbury, who, on the 9th of February wrote to Lord Whitworth a statement of the views then entertained by this government relative to Malta. He states, that agreeably to the principles on which the treaty of Amiens was made, His Majesty would have had a right to demand some compensation for the late acquisitions of power which France had made on the Continent; but, that he had waived these pretensions, and that a communication respecting an amicable arrangement as to the evacuation of Malta had been actually prepared, and was about to be sent to Lord Whitworth, when the attention of his Majesty's government was attracted by the official report of Colonel Sebastiani, (4) which appeared in the Moniteur of the 30th of January.—"It "is impossible," says Lord Hawkesbury, "for His Majesty to view this report in any "other light than as an official publication; "for without referring particularly to expla- "nations which have been repeatedly given "upon the subject of publications in the "Moniteur, the article in question, as it "purports to be the report of the First "Consul in an accredited agent, as it ap- "pears to have been signed by Colonel Se- "bastiani himself, and as it is published in "the official paper, with an official title "affixed to it, must be considered as au- "thorized by the French government. This "report contains *the most unjustifiable inti-*

(3) Did ever any man besides Lord Whitworth write a sentence like this?

(4) See this Report; Register, Vol. III. p. 246.

" *nuations and charges against the officer who* " *commanded his forces in Egypt, and against* " *the British army in that quarter*, insinuations " and charges wholly destitute of founda- " tion, and such as would warrant His Ma- " jesty in demanding that satisfaction, " which, on occasions of this nature, inde- " pendent powers, in a state of amity, have " a right to expect from each other. *It dis-* " *closes, moreover, views in the highest degree* " *injurious to the interests of His Majesty's do-* " *minions, and directly repugnant to, and ut-* " *terly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter* " *of the treaty of peace* concluded between " His Majesty and the French government; " and His Majesty would feel that he was " wanting in a proper regard to the honour " of his crown, and to the interests of his " dominions, if he could see with indiffer- " ence such a system developed and avowed. " His Majesty cannot, therefore, regard the " conduct of the French government on " various occasions since the conclusion of " the Definitive Treaty, the insinuations " and charges contained in the report of " Colonel Sebastiani, and the views which " that report discloses, without feeling it " necessary for him distinctly to declare, " that it will be impossible for him to enter " into any further discussion relative to " Malta, unless he receives satisfactory ex- " planation on the subject of this commu- " nication."—This was on the 9th of February; *satisfactory explanation* with regard to Sebastiani's report was the object, and must have been the only rational object; for, as to the abuse of General Stuart and the British army in Egypt, strange indeed would it have been for the ministers to make that a ground of quarrel after the affair of Captain D'Auvergne, and after the official publication, in the Moniteur, in which His Majesty himself was styled the *rewarder of assassins*. What was there, then, in this report of Sebastiani? What views did it disclose so peculiarly injurious to the interests of His Majesty's *dominions*, and so much more repugnant to, and inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace, than any of the other publications which France had issued since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty? Sebastiani observes, that " six " thousand French would at present be " enough to conquer Egypt;" but, we believe, that a fair construction of this sentence, if considered together with the context, will by no means warrant the inference, that the French *intended* to attempt such an expedition. The report is full of lies and vain boasting; but it does not breathe a spirit so hostile to this country as many other previous publications in the Moniteur, and this is a fact which will be denied by no man who has read those publications. But whatever might be the anger or alarm excited by this report, " *satisfactory* " *explanation*" was all that was demanded or expected on the subject; and, accordingly, we find Talleyrand, on the 17th of February, desiring to know from Lord Whitworth " what was *the nature and degree* " *of the satisfaction* which his Majesty would " require," and Lord Whithworth, for want of a better answer, we suppose, replied, that " he could not pretend to say!!!"—On the Friday previous to the 21st of February, Lord Whitworth had a two hours conversation with Buonaparté, who positively denied having any intentions of invading Egypt.—As this Ambassador of ours talks about Fridays and Tuesdays as familiarly as if he were writing to a cousin in the country, and as we have not an almanack before us, we must now and then use a circumlocution in describing the time at which certain circumstances passed.—On the 21st of February Lord Whitworth saw Talleyrand, and told him, that, " what he had said to the First " Consul (at their long interview) amount- " ed to an assurance of the readiness of his " Majesty's ministers to remove all subjects " of discussion, and to *fulfil strictly the en-* " *gagements which they had contracted*, in as " much as that could be reconciled *with the* " *safety of the state*," which, by the by, was rather an odd sort of declaration; but, those who have read these dispatches will experience very little surprise at any thing they shall in future meet with from the pen of Lord Whitworth. Talleyrand replied, " that" (alluding to the subject of Sebastiani's report) " a project was in contemplation, by " which *the integrity of the Turkish Empire* " *would be so effectually secured*, as to *do away* " *every cause of doubt or uneasiness*, either " with regard to Egypt or any part of the " Turkish dominions."—In answer to a communication of this promise Lord Hawkesbury wrote to Lord Whitworth on the 28th of February, (5) saying:—" From " the postscript of your Excellency's letter, " it appears that a project was in contem- " plation, by which, according to the de- " claration of Mr. Talleyrand, the integrity " of the Turkish territory would be secured " so as to do away every cause of doubt or " uneasiness either with regard to Egypt or " to any other part of the Turkish domi- " nions. His Majesty *will consider the com-*

(5) There is, in the copy laid before the Houses of Parliament, a mistake in the date of this letter of Lord Hawkesbury. It should be 28th and not 18th, since it acknowledges the receipt of a letter, dated Paris, 21st February.

" *munication of such a project as indicating a* " *disposition on the part of the French govern* " *ment, to afford him explanation and satisfac-* " *tion respecting some of the points which have* " *been the subject of his representations.* But " after all that passed, his Majesty cannot " consent that his troops should evacuate " the Island of Malta, until *substantial secu-* " *rity* has been provided for those objects, " which, under the present circumstances, " might be materially endangered by their " removal." — Here we see them rising from *satisfactory explanation* to *substantial security*, a very considerable step, and which cannot, we think, be fairly ascribed to any thing short of a desire, and even a determination, to protract the dispute and to hang on upon Malta, for some purpose, other than that which was alleged. At any rate, however, who would not have expected from this language of Lord Hawkesbury, that the project of Talleyrand, that project, the communication of which his Majesty " would " consider as indicating a disposition, on " the part of the French government, *to af-* " *ford him explanation and satisfaction* respect- " ing some of the points in dispute;" who would not have regarded this as the language of conciliation, as the harbinger of peace? What, then, must have been the surprise of Lord Whitworth, what must have been the surprise of Buonaparté, and what must be the astonishment and indignation of the British people, to hear, that their ministers, without hearing one word further from Paris, without waiting for the possibility of an answer to the letter conveying this conciliatory language, brought a message to the Parliament calling for *preparations for war!* The letter, which we have last quoted, was, as we have before remarked, written on the 28th of February; on the 7th of March the message was resolved on, and a copy of it transmitted to Lord Whitworth; and, between the pacific letter of the 28th of February and the delivery of the message, *no communication, touching the dispute with France, was made to the ministers, from any quarter whatever!*

Strange, wonderfully strange and inconsistent as this conduct appears, however, the mystery vanishes in an instant, when we find, which was really the case, that on the 5th or 6th of March, before the answer to Lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 28th of February could reach London, *news arrived, that General Dundas had re-captured the Cape of Good Hope.* The ministers perceived the odium and the danger, to which the communication of this event would expose them, unless they could, previously to its being generally known, place the nation in a warlike attitude. They had just grace enough left to dread the infamy of announcing their recommencement of hostilities at the Southern point of Africa, while they were speaking the language of peace and amity in Europe; and they were, too, far from being certain, that Buonaparté would not instantly attempt an invasion of Ireland or England by way of revenge. Therefore it was that they brought the message, therefore it was that they armed; and, having thus prepared themselves, the news of the re capture of the Cape was communicated to the Public, who, not perceiving the ruse de guerre, and not reflecting on the nature of the transaction, regarded the re-capture as a lucky circumstance, instead of viewing it as the grossest of follies, or the most shameful act of fraud, that ever was committed by a nation.

Of the cause of this re-capture, too, and of the subsequent evacuation, the papers before us furnish an explanation. On the 3d of October last, we find the accomplished Mr. Merry writing to his no less accomplished principal in Downing Street, and conveying to him an overture of a Swiss agent at Paris, who, having failed in his negotiations with Buonaparté, and having found the door of all the other foreign Ambassadors shut against him, applied, as to a pis-aller, to our dignified and sapient representative. This enterprising Swiss wanted arms, ammunition, stores, and, above all, *money*, sticking to the old proverb " point " d'argent point de Suisse;" and, it really appears, that our ministers, those ministers who were, and who still are, suffering the French royalists to starve in the streets of London; those ministers who abandoned to the mercy, or rather to the hellish cruelty, of the Corsican murderer, the brave, the faithful, the loyal Vendeans, thousands of whom have, since the signature of the Definitive Treaty, fallen beneath his knife; those ministers, who, at that very moment were taking measures to " *transport*" General Georges and his gallant followers to the woods of Canada, in order to sooth the rebel usurper against whom they had fought in the service of England; those very ministers listen to the proposition of this Swiss adventurer; and, without more ado, actually dispatched one of their habile corps diplomatique to Switzerland with offers of " *pecuniary succours.*" Mr. Moore, who was the knight errant chosen upon this occasion, sallied forth in search of adventures on the 10th of October, at which time the ministers sent out orders of retention to their other knight at the Cape of Good Hope. At the same time that Mr. Moore was dispatched to Switzerland or its neighbour-

hood, a remonstrance was made by Lord Hawkesbury to Mr. Otto, to which *no answer* has ever been given from that day to this.—On the 31st of Oct. Mr. Moore writes home, that, upon his arrival at Constance, on the 27th, he found that the Diet of Schwitz had made a formal submission to the French arms; and, on the 25th of November, Lord Hawkesbury writes to him to return home; which the unfortunate knight was, doubtless, very glad to do, having, without even entering their territory, rendered the Swiss much about the same sort of service as that which Don Quixotte rendered the farmer's boy; and having himself been, for nearly two months, the standing jest of the French and German writers, who absolutely laughed him off the Continent.—When, therefore, it was known, that the Diet of Schwitz had submitted, the ministers hastened to countermand the orders they had sent out for the retention of the Cape. They were in a humour now to surrender every thing; for, under the date of the 30th of November, we find an apology sent by Lord Hawkesbury for General Stuart's not having evacuated Egypt, and stating, that an order had *now* been sent him to do it immediately. There was still some excuse for keeping Malta till the guarantees were completed; but that too would have been surrendered, had no orders been gone out for the retention of the Cape. Those orders might be executed, and the news might come off, before the counter-order arrived; if so, as we should have had nothing at all left in hand, a war, on the part of France, would have instantly ensued; she would, as her first act, have seized on Malta and on Egypt, just about the time when we should have heard of the final surrender of the Cape. This the "*safe* politicians" were afraid of, and, therefore, they kept talking about *arrangements*, *grand-masters*, *guarantees*, and *Sebastiani's Report*, till they should hear whether their order for surrendering the Cape overtook the order for its retention. It did not. The recapture was made; the news came while they were eking out their tenure upon the gasconades of Sebastiani, which appear to have been their last resource, and instantly they changed their tone from the pacific language of Lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 28th of February, to that of the King's Message and the measures subsequent thereto.

Now, therefore, and *not till now*, the "*important* discussions," mentioned in the Message *began*. A demand was now, for the first time, made to retain Malta for a term of years, or in perpetuity; and, as we before observed, a dispute was thus *invented* by the ministers, to hide their real motives. Having, however, begun the quarrel, they soon brought into it all those points which ought to have been the subject of discussion long before; but, the real object of the Message and the armament was, the dread which they justly entertained of the consequences that might arise from the news of the recapture of the Cape finding them in an attitude of profound peace. When they perceived, that this news, being almost immediately followed by that of a final restoration of the Cape, produced no very great effect in France and Holland, they would gladly have recalled the Message together with its attendant measures; but, here the love of place interposed; they well knew that the *cause* of the Message would have been demanded at their hands; they well knew, that proof of the "*military preparations*" having ceased, proof of the satisfactory termination of the "*important discussions*," would have been required, in order to justify the discontinuance of the armament; such proof they could not have given the true motive of their conduct; must have appeared, and even the vain and insolent Addingtons had not the assurance to hope, that the people would have patiently borne the expense of two or three millions merely on account of those upstarts having retained, for a few days, a post since given up. Something, therefore, and something a little solid, too, they were compelled to obtain in their own defence, and to this we have to attribute their demands respecting Malta. If they obtained what they asked, it gave them a new lease of their places; if not, they could but lose those places, a loss which already threatened them, and which, on account of the finances in particular, they began to regard as inevitable. Their demands were not acceded to, and the consequence is, we are now in a state of war; a war for which there were and are many *good and sufficient* causes, a war which is absolutely necessary to the very existence of England as an independent nation, but which, as far as is proved by the diplomatic papers, is grounded upon pretexts totally false, and which, if the language of the declaration be adhered to, may consistently be closed, without having effected any one of the objects for which alone it ought to have been commenced; a war, in short, undertaken neither for national honour nor national security, but solely for purposes of ministerial interest and ambition.—And, is it true, can it possibly be true, that Mr. Pitt will defend the authors of this measure? Will

be for ever blast his fame by identifying himself with these men? We trust not; but, whatever may be his line of conduct, whatever national sacrifices he may be determined to make rather than acknowledge his error respecting the treaty of Amiens, rather than suffer his creatures to incur the responsibility which the nation has a right to demand at their hands, we hope that the Parliament will not forget, or neglect, *their* duty to their Sovereign and his people.

"We are" say the writers of a daily paper, "the very last who would attempt to "vindicate the conduct of the present crazy "and impotent ministry. Such a task would "require the greatest effort of ingenuity. "At this awful and alarming crisis, however, "when the enemy is at our gate—when he "threatens the destruction of our dearest "rights and liberties—when he avows that "nothing will satisfy him but the complete "humiliation or slavery of Englishmen, the "reduction of this seat of freedom to the "groveling and detestable state of a French "province—*it is then our duty to invigorate the "measures of Government*. At such a moment-"ous and dangerous crisis, *party distinctions "and party prejudices ought to cease*, and the "only spirit of emulation ought to be, who, "on such a great and urgent occasion, will "first meet and repel our common Enemy, "and the Enemy of Mankind."—Amen! So be it, with all our hearts! We are under the influence of *no party*; we are of no party but that of our King and his faithful people. Yes, perish the man, who would not, at this time, endeavour to "*invigorate* the measures of government." That is the very object of all our endeavours, and it will be readily allowed, that nothing is so likely to effect it, as driving from that government *weakness and pusillanimity*. But, the government, to have lasting vigour, must possess the confidence of the people. It may just sustain itself by means of their money; but, in order to make the required exertions, it must have their hearts also, and these are not to be obtained without an *assurance*, without "the *evidence of facts*," that another peace of Amiens will not be made; that the interests and honour of their country will not be again sacrificed to gratify the avarice and the vanity of another set of weak and wicked ministers. Until they obtain such an assurance, they will never again give their cordial support to the government; and this assurance can be given them only in bringing to justice, strict justice, the authors of their present calamity and disgrace. True it is, that the enemy will be satisfied with nothing short of the slavery of Englishmen, nothing short of "reducing this seat of freedom to the gro-"velling and detestable state of a province "of France;" but, let it be remembered, that it was to this enemy, this insolent, and malignant enemy, that the present ministers surrendered the means of effecting his object (if it ever is to be effected) and that they did this, too, with a perfect knowledge of the disposition and intentions of that enemy. Till, therefore, justice be rendered them on this score, what hope can they entertain from any sacrifices or exertions of theirs? and what confidence can they repose in the government which shall refuse them that justice?

NOTICES.

Next week we shall publish two sheets, and, shall, if possible, enter fully into our proposed discussion relative to the *justice and necessity of impeaching the ministers*, a subject to which, we are glad to perceive, the public has, at last, turned its serious attention.

☞ Correspondents will, we doubt not, have the goodness to excuse our omissions of this week. The communications respecting Malta shall certainly appear in our next.

*** The readers of the Register must, on several occasions have derived great pleasure and information, from the writings which have been published therein, under the name of SWENSKA. They will doubtless remember that it was from this gentleman, we received and published an intimation of the project for the new division of Germany, several days before even the ministers had any suspicion on the subject. We have lately made some extracts from a work by the same hand: some copies of this work, which has been published at the Hague, are now received in London, and we take the liberty to recommend its perusal to every gentleman who wishes to possess an accurate knowledge of the present situation, interests and views of the nations on the continent. The author writes generally from personal observation; and, as to France in particular, his information is interesting and valuable beyond description.—The work is English, and the price is 12s. It is entitled "*Sketches on the "Intrinsic Strength, Military and Naval Force "of France and Russia; with remarks on their "present connexion, political influence, and future "projects.*"—Sold by Harding, Pall Mall; Bagshaw, Bow Street, Covent Garden; and Richardson, Royal Exchange.

ERRATUM in last sheet, p. 735, l. 29 for *Darnley* read *Danby*.

Printed by Cox and Baylis, No. 75, Great Queen Street, and published by R. Bagshaw, Bow Street, Covent Garden, where former Numbers may be had; sold also by E. Harding, No. 18, Pall-Mall.